An approach to Wittgenstein’s antirealism

Antoni Defez

Resumen


This article intends to analyze, in general, the romantic roots of Wittgenstein thought and, specifically, what could have been the position of Wittgenstein, especially the second Wittgenstein, on the philosophical problem of the language-reality relationship. No doubt it is a bold exercise, since Wittgenstein did not openly deal with this question, and would have considered it nonsense. However, its elucidation- the idea that Wittgenstein was committed to antirealism- seems to make his conception of language more understandable, and in particular how private languages would not be possible.


Palabras clave


Wittgenstein, Language, Reality, Antirealism, Private language

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Referencias


James, W., Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947.

Nietzsche, F., "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", in The Portable Nietzsche. London: Peguin Books, 1976.

Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Putnam, H., The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987.

Putnam, H., Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988.

Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.

Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.

Wittgenstein, L., Culture and Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21500/22563202.3192